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  A particular ceiling on atmospheric CO2 concentrations can be maintained through 
a variety of emission pathways. Over the past decade, there has been considerable debate 
over the characteristics of a least-cost pathway. Some have suggested that a gradual 
departure from the emissions baseline will be the most cost-effective because it reduces the 
pressure for premature retirement of the existing capital stock, and it provides valuable 
time to develop low-cost, low-carbon emitting substitutes. Others counter that a major flaw 
in analyses that support this line of reasoning is that they ignore learning-by-doing (LBD).  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of LBD on the timing and costs of emissions 
abatement. With regard to timing, we find that including learning-by-doing does  not 
significantly alter the conclusions of previous studies that treated technology cost as 
exogenous. The analysis supports the earlier conclusion that for a wide range of 
stabilization ceilings, a gradual transition away from the “no policy” emissions baseline is 
preferable to one that requires substantial near-term reductions. We find that the major 
impact of including learning-by-doing is on the costs of emission abatement. Depending 
upon the sensitivity of costs to cumulative experience, LBD can substantially reduce the 
overall costs of emissions abatement.   
 




The Impact of Learning-By-Doing on the Timing and Costs of CO2 Abatement 






The issue of learning-by-doing (LBD) has become an integral part of the climate 
debate. LBD is the process by which the costs of new technologies decline as a function of 
cumulative experience. Although a number of studies have addressed the potential role of 
learning-by-doing in the context of climate policy, the effect of LBD on the timing and 
costs of emissions abatement remains unclear.
1–8 The objective of the current paper is to 
help clarify the role of LBD as it relates to the choice of emissions abatement strategy. 
The ultimate goal of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is “the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”
9 
Although what constitutes “dangerous” has yet to be determined, for most concentration 
ceilings there is likely to be flexibility in terms of the emissions pathway for achieving 
stabilization. This is because future  CO2 concentrations are determined more by 
cumulative emissions rather than year-by-year emissions.
10  
Although little attention is placed on abatement costs in the selection of a 
concentration ceiling, cost-effectiveness does come into play in determining how to meet a 
prescribed target. In particular, the UNFCCC states that “… policies and measures to deal 
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to insure global benefits at the lowest 
possible cost” (ref. 9). Hence, once a concentration ceiling has been chosen, the issue then 
becomes one of how to stay beneath the ceiling in a cost-effective manner.  
Some have suggested that the least-cost emissions pathway is one that departs only 
gradually from the emissions baseline.
11 A gradual departure avoids premature 
obsolescence of the existing capital stock, and it provides more time to develop low-cost 
low-carbon emitting substitutes. These analyses are based on models that typically treat the 
decline in technology costs as a function of time, ignoring the potential contribution of 
learning-by-doing.  
 




The exclusion of LBD has led others to question the conclusions of such models.
12 
They argue that an effective way to reduce abatement costs is to accelerate learning-by-
doing. This can be accomplished through mandating a sharp near-term departure from the 
emissions baseline. This would raise the price of energy from existing carbon-intensive 
technologies. Currently uneconomical technologies would then become attractive. As their 
costs drop, so would the overall costs of emissions abatement.  
Still others suggest that learning-by-doing has an ambiguous impact on the timing 
of emissions abatement (refs. 2 and 5). LBD reduces the costs of future abatement. This 
suggests delaying abatement activities. However, there is added value to current 
abatement. It contributes to cumulative experience and hence helps reduce the costs of 
future abatement. It is unclear which of these two effects dominates.  
In evaluating the desirability of one emissions pathway over another, we need to 
consider both the near-term costs to the economy and also the benefits of having low-cost 
substitutes earlier than might otherwise be the case. The near-term costs will be 
determined, in large part, by the inertia in the energy system. Much of the existing capital 
stock is long lived (buildings, power plants, and motor vehicles). This places constraints on 
the rate at which new technologies can be introduced. The switch to a less carbon-intensive 
economy cannot happen overnight. Tight near-term constraints can accelerate the process, 
but at a cost. Whether these near-term costs are warranted will depend upon how the costs 
of low-emitting substitutes respond to learning-by-doing. 
Before turning to the analysis, some caveats are in order. First, the present paper 
focuses exclusively on learning-by-doing. Another important channel for inducing 
technical change is R&D. Because knowledge is not fully appropriable, private markets 
probably underinvest in R&D. For a discussion of the role of R&D in providing low-cost 
substitutes to high-carbon emitting technologies, see refs. 2, 5, 13–15. For a general 
overview of the issue of induced technical change, see ref. 16. 
Second, the focus of the current work is on the timing and the costs of emissions 
abatement required in order to meet a given concentrations target. We do not address the 
issue of how the potential impacts attributed to climate change might be affected by 
choosing one emission pathway over another when complying with a prescribed 
concentration ceiling. Previous work has suggested that the differences in terms of  
 




temperature increase and sea level rise may be small (ref. 11). Nevertheless, analysis to 
date has been rudimentary, and further work is required. To the extent that the choice of 
emissions pathways differs in terms of its impacts on climate change, these differences 
need to be considered. 
Finally, consistent with UNFCCC, we have assumed that once a concentration 
ceiling is adopted, the goal is to achieve it in a cost-effective manner. If we were 
conducting a cost-benefit rather than a cost-effectiveness analysis, the reduction in 
abatement costs brought about by learning-by-doing would lead to more abatement in the 





In this section, we provide a brief overview of MERGE (a model for evaluating 
regional and  global  effects of greenhouse gas reductions). MERGE is an intertemporal 
general equilibrium model of the global economy, which incorporates perfect foresight. 
Although we will focus on global results, the underlying model is based on a world divided 
into nine geopolitical regions: 1) the USA, 2) OECDE (Western Europe), 3) Japan, 4) 
CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), 5) EEFSU (Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union), 6) China, 7) India, 8) MOPEC (Mexico and OPEC) and, 9) ROW (the rest 
of the world). MERGE is calibrated to the year 2000. Future periods are modeled in 10-
year intervals. Hence, the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-2012) is 
represented as 2010.
17 Economic values are reported in US dollars of constant 1997 
purchasing power. 
MERGE provides a bottom-up perspective of the energy supply system. A 
distinction is made b etween electric and nonelectric energy. Table 1 identifies the 
alternative sources of electricity supply. The first five technologies represent sources in 
operation during the base year, 2000. The second group of technologies includes 
candidates for serving electricity needs in 2010 and beyond.  
 
 
                                                 
d For a detailed description of MERGE and its key assumption, see our website: 
 http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/.  
 


























(Billion tons per TWH) 
HYDRO  Hydroelectric and 
geothermal  Existing  40.0    0.0000 
NUC  Remaining initial nuclear  Existing  50.0    0.0000 
GAS-R  Remaining initial gas fired  Existing  35.7    0.1443 
OIL-R  Remaining initial oil fired  Existing  37.8    0.2094 
COAL-R  Remaining initial coal fired  Existing  20.3    0.2533 
GAS-N  Advanced combined cycle  2010  30.3    0.0935 
GAS-A  Fuel cells with capture and 
sequestration–gas fuel 
2030  47.7    0.0000 
COAL-N  Pulverized coal without 
CO2 recovery 
2010  40.6    0.1955 
COAL-A  Fuel cells with capture and 
sequestration–coal fuel 
2040  55.9    0.0068 
IGCC 
Integrated gasification and 




c  62.0    0.0240 
ADV-HC 
Carbon-free technologies; 
costs do not decline with 
learning by doing  




costs decline with learning 
by doing (high cost) 




costs decline with learning 
by doing (low cost) 
2010  95.0  60.0  0.0000 
 
a Introduction dates and costs may vary by region. 
 
b Except for oil and gas costs and the learning by doing component, we assume that the costs of all      
   technologies decline at a rate of 0.5% per year beginning in 2000.  Note that this column is used to    
   calculate the autonomous learning component.  The earliest possible introduction date is specified in  
   the previous column. 
 
c IGCC is currently available; however, without capture and sequestration. 
 
d For the LBDE technologies, it is necessary to specify an initial quantity. We assume that the      
   cumulative experience prior to 2000 is only 0.2 tkWh global.  
 




Previous versions of MERGE have included two electric “backstop” technologies: 
ADV-HC and ADV-LC. These refer to advanced high and low-cost carbon-free electricity 
generation, respectively. The low-cost variant is not available until well after the high-cost 
one. Their distinguishing characteristic is that once introduced, they are available at a 
constant marginal cost. Any of a number of technologies could be included in these 
categories: wind, solar, advanced nuclear, biomass, coal-based generation with carbon 
capture and sequestration, and others. Given the enormous disagreement as to which of 
these technologies or combination of technologies will succeed in terms of economic 
attractiveness and public acceptability, we refer to them generically rather than attempt to 
pick specific winners.  
In the current version of the model (MERGE 4.5), we continue to refer to these 
technologies generically, but follow a somewhat different approach. We assume that the 
decline in the cost of backstops will be a function of cumulative experience.
e To do this, 
we have replaced ADV-LC with LBDE (learning-by-doing, electric). Its total costs are 
initially identical to ADV-HC (95 mills/kWh), but its learning costs decline by 20% for 
every doubling of cumulative experience.
18 The potential for reducing costs through 
learning-by-doing; however, is limited. Given the uncertainties, we explore two 
alternatives. For a pessimistic case (LBDE-HC), we assume that costs can be reduced to 55 
mills/kWh through learning-by-doing. For our optimistic case (LBDE-LC), we assume that 
these costs can be reduced to 35 mills/kWh. In addition, we assume that due to 
autonomous technical progress, the time-dependent electricity generating costs decline at 
the rate of 0.5% per year. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the LBDE costs might decline in the absence of a carbon 
constraint. The top two lines are based upon the two alternative assumptions about 
learning-by-doing. We also show how the costs of COAL-N might change over time in 
two different regions. Due to coal transportation costs, the costs of coal-fired electricity are 
higher in OECD Europe (OECDE) than in the US. As a result, OECDE begins investing in 
LBDE-LC and LBDE-HC, in 2010 and 2030, respectively. Our cost curves reflect the 
                                                 
e See ref. 7 for a description of the approach used in the present study. A heuristic is employed to deal with 
the problem of isolated, local optima.  
 




assumption that learning-by-doing is based on global diffusion. That is, experience in one 
region will reduce the costs of a technology in all regions. Notice that those technologies 
that do not benefit from learning-by-doing, for example COAL-N, still experience some 
decline in costs due to autonomous technical progress. 
Table 2 identifies alternative sources of  nonelectric energy within the model. 
Notice that oil and gas supplies for each region are divided into 10 cost categories. The 
higher cost groups have been added to reflect the potential use of nonconventional sources. 
With regard to carbon-free alternatives, the choices have been divided into two broad 
categories: RNEW (low-cost renewables such as ethanol from biomass) and NEB-HC 
(high cost backstops such as hydrogen produced through photovoltaics and electrolysis). 
The key distinction is that RNEW is in limited supply, but NEB-HC is available in 
unlimited quantities at a constant but considerably higher marginal cost. As in the case of 
electric energy, we have added a new category of technologies. This is termed LBDN 
(learning-by-doing, non-electric). As with its counterpart in the electric sector, costs are a 
function of cumulative experience. In essence, LBDN adds a learning component to NEB-
HC. In addition, all nonelectric technologies enjoy autonomous technical progress. 
 
TABLE 2.  NONELECTRIC ENERGY SUPPLIES AVAILABLE TO US 
a  
Technology 














carbon per GJ) 
CLDU  Coal––direct uses  2.50    0.0241 
OIL-1-10  Oil––10 cost categories  3.00-5.25    0.0199 
GAS-1-10  Gas––10 cost categories  2.00-4.25    0.0137 
RNEW  Renewables  6.00    0.0000 
NEB-HC  Nonelectric backstop  14.00    0.0000 
LBDN 
c 
Carbon free technologies; 
costs decline with 
learning-by-doing 
14.00  6.00  0.0000 
a  Costs may vary by region. 
b Except for the learning by doing component, we assume that the costs of all technologies decline 
at a rate of 0.5% per year beginning in 2000. 
c We assume that the cumulative global experience prior to 2000 is only one GJ.  
 




           Typically, the energy producing and consuming capital stock is long lived. In 
MERGE, introduction and decline constraints are placed on new technologies. We assume 
that the production from new technologies in each region is constrained to 1% of total 
production in the year in which it is initially introduced and can increase by a factor of 
three for each decade thereafter. The decline rate is limited to 2% per year for new 
technologies, but there is no decline rate limit for existing technologies. This is to allow for 
the possibility that some emission ceilings may be sufficiently low to force premature 
retirement of the existing capital stock. 
          Turning from the supply to the demand side of the model, we use nested production 
functions
f to determine how aggregate economic output depends upon the inputs of capital, 
labor, electric and non-electric energy. In this way, the model allows for both price-
induced and autonomous (non-price) energy conservation and for interfuel substitution. 
Since there is a “putty-clay” formulation, short-run elasticities are smaller than long-run 
elasticities. This increases the costs of rapid short-run adjustments. The model also allows 
for macroeconomic feedbacks. Higher energy and/or environmental costs will lead to 
fewer resources available for current consumption and for investment in the accumulation 
of capital stocks.  
It is assumed that there can be international trade in emission rights. This allows 
regions with high marginal abatement costs to purchase emission rights from regions with 
low marginal abatement costs. There is also trade in oil, gas, and energy-intensive goods. 
Each of the model’s nine regions maximizes the discounted utility of its consumption 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Each region’s wealth includes not only 
capital, labor and exhaustible resources, but also its negotiated international share in global 
emission rights.  
 
III. The Effect of Learning-By-Doing on Reference Case Emissions 
 
We begin the analysis by examining how CO2 emissions might grow in the absence 
of policy intervention. We explore three scenarios. In the first, there is no learning-by-
                                                 
f These production functions represent an additional opportunity for induced technical change. As the cost of 
carbon emitting technologies changes, there will be interfuel substitution between electric and nonelectric 
energy. Similarly, as the price of energy changes, there will be substitution between energy and capital-labor.  
 




doing. The costs of all technologies are specified exogenously. The second and third 
scenarios incorporate learning-by-doing, but differ in their potential for cumulative 
experience to lower costs.  
Figure 2 illustrates how the inclusion of learning can affect baseline projections of 
CO2 emissions over the 21 
st century.  The top line shows the “no LBD” baseline. That is, 
neither the costs of the ADV-HC nor of NEB-HC decline as a function of cumulative 
experience. Their costs depend only on the passage of time. The other two trajectories 
incorporate learning- by- doing. They differ, however, with regard to the potential for cost 
reductions in the electric sector.
g 
Under the assumptions adopted in the present analysis, learning- by- doing has a 
negligible effect on the baseline during the first half of this century. However, the effect 
can be substantial in the second half. In the absence of a carbon constraint, the transition to 
a low-carbon economy i s governed by the exhaustion of conventional oil and gas 
resources, the relative cost and availability of each technology, and the inertia in the energy 
system. 
With LBDE-LC, the technology’s ultimate cost is sufficiently attractive so that 
there is an incentive to start the learning-by-doing process early. For this case, global 
emissions peak in the middle of the century and then turn downward - even in the absence 
of a carbon constraint. Concentrations eventually stabilize in the range of 650 ppmv. 
Conversely, with LBDE-HC, the relatively high cost provides little incentive for its 
introduction prior to 2040. As a result, we observe little change from the “no LBD” 
baseline throughout the time horizon under study. 
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of the  expansion constraints. Suppose for 
example, that there is no constraint on the rate at which the LBDE technologies can enter 
the energy system. In the case of LBDE-LC, the percent of global electricity generation 
increases. This is a reflection of the technology’s ultimate economic attractiveness. 
Conversely, the expansion constraint has little impact on the rate of introduction of the 
                                                 
gAssumptions regarding LBDN (learning-by-doing, nonelectric) remain the same in both cases. Because of 
its high initial costs, this technology does not begin to play a significant role, i.e., providing 10% of 
nonelectric energy supply, until 2070.   
 




LBDE-HC technology. Even after allowing for learning effects, this technology has a high 
cost, and is unattractive in most regions. 
These results highlight the potential importance of learning-by-doing in 
determining the baseline. If learning-by-doing can lead to technologies that are both low 
carbon emitters and economically competitive, then it can substantially reduce the need for 
external intervention. Carbon emissions will decline naturally in response to market forces.  
 
IV. The Effect of Learning-By-Doing on Least-Cost Abatement Pathways 
 
We now examine the impact of learning-by-doing on the timing and costs of 
emission  abatement policies. Two types of constraints are explored: those on ultimate 
concentrations and those on year-by-year emissions. The former is more in the spirit of the 
UNFCCC. The latter is more nearly consistent with the Kyoto Protocol. It prescribes a 
constraint on emissions in each commitment period. 
           We are far from reaching agreement on what might constitute “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. This will likely be the subject of intense 
scientific and political debate for some time to come. For illustrative purposes, this section is 
based on the goal of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 550 ppmv (SCC-550). We 
also assume that the criterion is to achieve this concentration target in an economically 
efficient manner.
h To do this will require full “where” and “when” flexibility. That is, 
emissions are reduced both where and when it is economical to do so. This is apart from the 
issue of who pays the bill. If there is full international trade in emission rights, equity and 
efficiency issues may be separated.  
           There are three distinct phases in the transition to a low-carbon energy system. Figure 
4 suggests that with full “where” and “when” flexibility, the least-cost abatement trajectory 
stays very close to the baseline through 2020. This is true both with and without learning-by-
doing. Roughly speaking, a concentration ceiling places a limit on the cumulative amount of 
carbon that can be emitted into the atmosphere. But how do we allocate this carbon budget 
over time? Not surprisingly, the least-cost emissions pathway involves dependence on 
                                                 
h We stress, however, that to the extent that “command and control” approaches are chosen over “market 
mechanisms”, abatement costs will be higher.  
 




inexpensive high-carbon emitting technologies in the early years, and a gradual shift to lower-
carbon emitting technologies in the future once their decline in costs makes them more 
economically attractive. 
In the case of LBDE-LC, future costs are sufficiently low to warrant some early 
investment even though it is presently uneconomical. However, the inertia in the energy 
system limits how quickly the LBDE-LC technologies can expand. In the case of LBDE-HC, 
learning-by-doing in the early years results in a less dramatic reduction in future costs. As a 
result, there is less inducement for early investment.  
  In the second phase (2020-2060), incorporating learning-by-doing has what initially 
appears to be a counter intuitive influence on the least-cost pathway. Figure 5 compares the 
three emission profiles for stabilizing CO2 concentrations at 550 ppmv. Although all three 
cases eventually show a substantial reduction in emissions, note that emissions are lower in 
phase II in the “no LBD” case. This is because, based upon the assumptions about technology 
cost and availability, there is no concern about locking into technologies that will soon prove 
to be economically inferior. With LBD, however, investors are reluctant to commit to low-
cost, low-carbon emitting substitutes when even lower-cost, lower-carbon emitting substitutes 
will soon be available. For example, in the “no LBD” case, COAL-A (e.g., the solid oxide 
fuel cell) becomes available in 2040 and is the technology of choice. However, when we 
incorporate learning-by-doing, the LBDE technologies win out even though their costs remain 
noncompetitive for another decade or so. The final phase (2060-2100) is the time frame in 
which the LBDE technologies have a clear economic advantage over all other electric 
technologies.  
  Although learning-by-doing has little impact on the timing of near-term emission 
reductions, it has a major impact on costs. Figure 6 shows cumulative discounted global 
abatement costs for stabilizing concentrations at 550 ppmv, assuming full “where” and “when” 
flexibility. Compared with no LBD, the LBDE-HC and LBDE-LC scenarios show a reduction 
in costs by 42 and 72%, respectively. Although learning-by-doing has little impact on the 
timing of emission reductions during the early decades of the 21
st century, it has a major 








V. Some Additional Sensitivity Analysis 
  The Impact of Learning-By-Doing Under Alternative Concentration Targets. Up to 
this point, we have assumed that the goal was to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 
550 ppmv. Now let us consider alternative concentration targets: 450 and 650 ppmv. Figure 7 
compares the least-cost stabilization pathway for these ceilings. With a target of 450 ppmv, we 
see an immediate departure from the emissions baseline––regardless of the LBD assumption. 
With such a tight ceiling, it is necessary to introduce major near-term changes in the energy 
system if we are to stay below the prescribed concentration level. The incremental value of 
carbon emission rights rises high enough to induce sufficient fuel switching and price-induced 
conservation to stay on the least-cost trajectory. See Table 3. The implicit tax is roughly an 
order of magnitude higher than that required for a ceiling of 550 ppmv or above. For a ceiling 
of 650 ppmv, very little is required in the early decades, hence the implicit tax is negligible. 
 
TABLE 3. INCREMENTAL VALUE OF CARBON EMISSION RIGHTS ($ PER TON OF CARBON) 
FOR ALTERNATIVE STABILIZATION CEILINGS 
 
  No LBD  LBDE-HC  LBDE-LC 
  2010  2020  2010  2020  2010  2020 
450 ppmv   75  134  70  126  72  129 
550 ppmv   9  16  7  12  6  11 
650 ppmv   2  4  0  2  0  0 
 
 Figure 8 shows the implications for discounted abatement costs over the 21st 
century. As one would expect, the costs are highest with a 450 ppmv target. The benefits 
from learning-by-doing will come too late to offset these increases in near-term costs.  
  The Impact of Learning-By-Doing on a Kyoto-Type Target. We now turn to a case 
closer to that suggested by the Kyoto Protocol. There is not “when” flexibility, nor is there 
complete “where” flexibility. This scenario is designed to achieve approximately the same 
level of concentrations in 2100 as SCC-550, but is more aggressive in terms of emission 
reductions in the early decades of the present century. We refer to this case as “Kyoto plus” 
(Kyoto+).  
  Specifically, we assume that all Annex B countries (with the exception of the US) 
adopt the Protocol during the first commitment period. Further, with an intertemporal general  
 




equilibrium model like MERGE, it is necessary to make assumptions about requirements for 
emission reductions in subsequent commitment periods. Here for illustrative purposes, we 
assume that Kyoto will be followed by subsequent protocols in which all Annex B countries 
agree to reduce emissions by an additional 10% per decade starting in 2020. For the US, this 
constraint in 2020 is assumed to be the same as if it had eventually adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol. Finally, we assume that all countries adopt binding targets and timetables by 2050. 
Clearly, the nature and timing of these future constraints are highly speculative, and they need 
to be subjected to extensive sensitivity analysis. The one adopted here provides an alternative 
emissions pathway to stabilization at 550 ppmv in 2100.  
  Figure 9 shows that regardless of the assumption about learning-by-doing, Kyoto+ 
results in an immediate departure from the baseline. In order to induce sufficient reductions, 
the incremental value of carbon emission rights must again be an order of magnitude higher 
than that associated with a 550 ppmv ceiling with complete “where” and “when” flexibility. 
See Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4. THE INCREMENTAL VALUE OF CARBON EMISSION RIGHTS ($ PER TON OF 
CARBON) FOR TWO ALTERNATIVE EMISSION PATHWAYS FOR A CEILING OF 550 PPMV 
 
  No LBD  LBDE-HC  LBDE-LC 
  2010  2020  2010  2020  2010  2020 
550 ppmv   9  16  7  12  6  11 
Kyoto+  99  164  101  168  102  170 
 
  Finally Figure 10 compares cumulative discounted abatement costs for SCC-550 and 
Kyoto+. In all cases, Kyoto+ represents a substantial increase in the overall costs relative to 
SCC-550.  
 
VI. Concluding Comments 
 
A particular concentration target can be achieved through a variety of emission 
pathways. Over the past decade, there has been considerable debate over the characteristics 
of a least-cost pathway. Some have suggested that a gradual departure from the emissions 
baseline will be the most cost-effective because it avoids premature retirement of the 
existing capital stock, and it provides valuable time to develop low-cost, low-carbon  
 




emitting substitutes. Others counter that a major flaw in this line of reasoning is that it 
ignores learning-by-doing. In this paper, we examine the impact of LBD on the timing and 
costs of emissions abatement.  
We find that including learning-by-doing does not alter the conclusions of earlier 
studies that focused on the timing of emission reductions. For ceilings of 550 ppmv and 
above, a gradual near-term departure from the emissions baseline is still preferred. For 
concentration targets in the neighborhood of 450 ppmv, a more rapid near-term departure 
is still required––with or without LBD.  
Although learning-by-doing may not accelerate the timing of the transition to a less 
carbon intensive infrastructure, it can have a major impact on the overall costs of the 
transition. This is particularly so for concentration ceilings of 550 ppmv and above. 
Cumulative discounted abatement costs are substantially lower relative to the “no LBD” 
case. However, for a 450 ppmv ceiling, most of the costs are associated with premature 
retirement of the existing capital stock. LBD can do little to reduce these costs. 
We emphasize that a gradual departure from the baseline is not a “do nothing” or 
“wait and see” strategy. The emissions baseline incorporates considerable technical 
progress on both the supply and demand sides of the energy sector. We also assume that to 
the extent that there are “no regrets” options, they will be incorporated in both the 
reference case and the policy case. For example, we do not need climate policy to take 
advantage of efficiency improvements that make sense in their own right. 
Finally, although emissions abatement represents immediate action, the choices are 
not confined to emissions abatement. The response to the threat of climate change suggests 
a portfolio of responses. These include: 1) emissions abatement, 2) adaptation, 3) reducing 
scientific uncertainty, and 4) the development and deployment of low-cost substitutes. The 
issue is not one of “either-or”, but what constitutes the right balance. This paper examines 
the interaction between two of the options in the portfolio: emissions abatement, and 
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Figure 1. Electricity Generating Costs for Three 





























Figure 2. Global Carbon Emissions –




































Figure 3. Percent of Global Electricity Generation 



























Figure 4. Global Emission Reductions Required to 

































































Figure 5. Global Carbon Emissions – SCC-550
 
Figure 6. Cumulative Discounted Global Abatement Costs 
for Stabilizing Concentrations at 550 ppmv 






































Figure 7.  Global Emission Reductions from the Baseline for  




































































































Figure 8. Cumulative Discounted Global Abatement 



































Figure 9. Global Emission Reductions Required 




































Figure 10. Cumulative Discounted Abatement Costs for 
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